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Abstract 
In December 2012 Japan requested the establishment of a World Trade Organization (WTO) Panel 
regarding AD duties that China had imposed on high-performance stainless steel seamless tubes (HP-
SSST). The European Union joined as a complainant in June 2013. To some degree, this dispute 
follows earlier ones involving China, as similar procedural and substantial issues were raised in 
previous cases. However, this is the first time that the WTO Panel rejected some important claims, 
only for those decisions to be reversed by the Appellate Body. Now that various rulings have clarified 
these legal issues, it remains to be seen if HP-SSST represents the last part of growing pains for 
Chinese authorities to learn about AD legal procedures.  
Keywords 
Antidumping, WTO trade disputes, impact analysis, essential fact, price undercutting, non-attribution, 
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1. Introduction* 
In December 2012 Japan requested the World Trade Organization (WTO) to establish a Panel 
regarding the antidumping (AD) duties that China had imposed on high-performance stainless steel 
seamless tubes (HP-SSST) a month earlier. As the second major exporter of these products, also 
targeted by the same AD measures, the European Union joined as a complainant in June 2013.  
The Panel’s decision was circulated early in 2015 and its ruling recognized that China had acted 
inconsistently with the WTO AD Agreement while at the same time rejecting some of the 
complainants’ claims. As a result, all parties (i.e. China, European Union, and Japan) appealed the 
Panel’s rulings. The Appellate Body upheld all the rulings in favor of the complainants and reversed 
most of the Panel’s decisions in favor of the defendant. In the end, China lost the case on almost all 
issues. Considering the final outcome, the dispute China - High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless 
Tubes (DS454 and DS460)
1
 is the last one to have reached the conclusion in a series of similar 
disputes against China’s AD actions and it repeats a familiar refrain (see Tables 3 and 5 for a 
summary): China has systematically acted inconsistently with the WTO AD Agreement, in particular 
with respect to fair comparison in dumping calculations, injury determination, and disclosure of 
essential facts. And the ongoing dispute brought about by Canada and focusing on the same 
substantive issues suggests that China has not repented itself.
2
 
The similarities between these disputes will be highlighted in the next sections while trying to limit 
repetition of similar reasoning to a minimum.
3
 At the same time, the legal and economic analysis will 
draw from previous arguments that WTO Panels, Appellate Body and the literature have put forward. 
Instead, through the discussion of a specific aspect (i.e. definition of domestic like product) of this 
case and how it has (not) surfaced in previous disputes, we speculate that the complainants may have 
had ground to claim that China had also acted inconsistently in another dimension. And it remains an 
open question why such an issue has not been pursued. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the case, 
product, industry and a comparison with other cases. The key legal findings are summarized in Section 
3 while Section 4 presents the legal and economic analysis of the Panel and Appellate Body’s rulings. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Factual Background for Products and Industry 
On 8 September 2011, pursuant to the requests by Jiangsu Wujin Stainless Steel Pipe Group Co. Ltd. 
and Changshu Huaxin Pipe Co. Ltd.,
4
 the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China 
(MOFCOM) initiated an AD investigation on HP-SSST products from the European Union and Japan, 
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1
 Panel Report, China - Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes 
(“HP-SSST”) from Japan and the European Union, WT/DS454, DS460/R. 
2
 China – Anti-dumping Measures on Imports of Cellulose Pulp from Canada, Request for Consultations (DS483), 
WT/DS483/1. 
3
 Interested readers are referred to the previous articles that have discussed these final rulings: see Prusa and Vermulst 
(2014, 2015), Moore and Wu (2015), and Mitchell and Prusa (2016). 
4
 Three other domestic producers, Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Yinhuan Precision Steel Tube Co. Ltd., 
and Baoshan Steel Co. Ltd., supported the AD petition (see Bown, 2016). 
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which are classified into Chinese HS codes 73044110, 73044910, 73045110 and 73045910 (although 
the final AD measures did not cover products under HS codes 73045110 and 73045910). MOFCOM 
used a one-year period between July 2010 and June 2011 for the dumping margin calculation and the 
three and a half year from January 2008 to June 2011 for the injury determination. On 8 November 
2012, MOFCOM found that the Japanese products accounted for 68% of the total imports and 
imposed AD duties of 9.2% for Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd., 14.4% for Kobe Special Tube Co. 
Ltd., and 14.4% for all others. Against imports from the European Union that represented about 23% 
of total imports,
5
 MOFCOM imposed AD duties of 9.7% for Tubacex Tubos Inoxidables S.A., 11.1% 
for Salzgitter Mannesmann Stainless Tubes Italia s.r.l., and 11.1% for all others.  
As a major target of the AD measures, Japan immediately reacted within the framework of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. On 20 December 2012, Japan brought the consultation request on 
China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless 
Tubes from Japan (“China – HPSST”; DS454), which became the second Japanese WTO dispute 
against China.
6
 On 13 June 2013, the European Union also requested consultation on China — 
Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes from 
the European Union (“China – HPSST”; DS460), which became the third EU AD dispute against 
China.
7
 
The product under investigation is HP-SSST with a carbon content of not less than 0.04% but not 
more than 1.2%, a chromium content of more than 16%, a nickel content of more than 7%, a niobium 
content of not less than 0.2%, a tensile strength of not less than 550Mpa, and a yield strength of over 
200Mpa.
8
 Due to the special composition of chemical elements, HP-SSST shows distinguishable 
features such as high endurance strength, structure stability, anti-steam oxidation and corrosion 
resistance at high temperature.
9
 Such high performance characteristics make them used mainly in 
superheaters and reheaters of supercritical or ultra-supercritical boilers in power stations. HP-SSST is 
normally classified into three categories, with different nomenclatures according to different national 
standards regimes and producers’ designations, as shown in Table 1. Following the notation of the 
legal proceedings, in the following we also identify the different products by the letters A, B, and C. 
Table 1. HP-SSST Product Identification 
Product ASTM Grade China National 
Standard GB5310-2008 
Mannesmann 
serial number 
Sumitomo 
serial number 
A TP347HFG 08Cr18Ni11NbFG DMV347HFG 347HFG 
B S30432 10Cr18Ni9NbCu3BN DMV304HCu Super304H 
C TP310HNbN 07Cr25Ni21NbN DMV310N HR3C 
Source: Panel Report, B-28. 
                                                     
5
 WTO, G/ADP/N/237/CHN, 2-3 (dated 10 April 2013). In fact, EU exports of HP-SSST to China were worth some €90 
million in 2009, but dropped to under €20 million in November 2012 (European Commission Press Release IP/13/772, 16 
August 2013). 
6
 The first dispute raised by Japan was China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum (DS433). China has not yet brought a complaint against Japan in the WTO system. 
7
 The two earlier AD disputes are China — Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners from the 
European Union (DS407) and China — Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from 
the European Union (DS425). As of June 2016, the European Union has brought seven cases against China. China has 
initiated four complaints against the European Union. 
8
 MOFCOM Announcement No. 72 of 2012 on the Final Ruling of the Anti-dumping Case against Imports of Certain 
High-performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes Originated in the EU and Japan, available at 
 <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/policyrelease/buwei/201211/20121108432478> (visited 6 March 2016).
  
9
 Ibid.  
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Grades B and C steel tubes used in ultra-supercritical power plant boilers significantly outperform 
Grade A steel tubes used in supercritical power plant boilers in terms of steam resistance oxidation 
thickness and fly ash corrosion resistance.
10
 Yet, the high-end grades (i.e. Grades B and C) can 
technically substitute for the low-end grade (i.e. Grade A), although “Grade B is about double the 
price of Grade A, and Grade C is about triple the price of Grade A”.11 As shown in Table 2, subject 
imports are mostly concentrated in Grades B and C steel tubes. However, during the period of 
investigation (POI) for dumping calculation (i.e. July 2010 till June 2011), 79.9% of the domestic 
production is allocated for Grade A products and only 20.1% for Grades B and C (with “trivial” sales 
of Grade C). 
Table 2. Market shares of subject imports 
 2008 2009 2010 01-06/2011 
Grade A 1.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Grade B (over 70% of product) 89.48% 96.65% 90.49% 97.63% 
Grade C (bulk of 30% of product) 100.00% 99.94% 99.10% 90.69% 
3 grades together 86.20% 87.03% 47.23% ≈ 50% 
Source: Table based on data in the Panel Report. 
Based on the evidence from 2008 to 2010, MOFCOM explained that the domestic industry situations 
improved in terms of, inter alia, indicators such as domestic sales, market share, capacity, output, 
labor productivity, salary per head, and net cash flow from operating activities. On the other hand, the 
domestic market showed signs of deterioration with respect to many indices including inventories, 
domestic sales price, domestic sales revenue, profits, net cash flow, and capital investment. For 
example, domestic sales revenue declined by 61.07% in 2009 in comparison to 2008. While the 
revenue recovered by 83.41% in 2010, a 15.50% reduction in annualized amount of revenue persisted 
from 2008 to 2010.
12
 
As for the issues that the complainants raised in this case, they deal mostly with the same legal 
claims as in the previous four AD disputes brought against China.
13
 As shown in Table 3,
14
 the main 
reason to have essentially identical legal issues repeated in all these disputes seems to be that the 
challenged AD measures were imposed in a relatively short period of time. Thus, given the timeframe 
of the Panels’ rulings, MOFCOM did not have sufficient time to incorporate the WTO rulings in its 
practices before the same issues were challenged again.
15
 However, Canada has initiated a dispute 
focusing on very similar legal claims in 2014 for AD measures that China has introduced against 
cellulose pulp. This ongoing dispute may suggest that the Chinese authorities have not really changed 
their procedures since three WTO disputes had reached their final verdict by the time that the case on 
cellulose pulp reached the preliminary stage (in November 2013). At the same time, it is curious that 
only Canada is a complainant although AD duties have also been imposed on exports from Brazil and 
the United States (at an even higher rate than for Canada). Does it mean that the United States do not 
believe that they would have had a strong case? Time will tell. 
  
                                                     
10
 Appellate Body (AB) Report, para.5.264. 
11
 Id, para.5.263. 
12
 Panel Report, para.7.166. 
13
 Those disputes are analyzed extensively in Prusa and Vermulst (2014, 2015), Moore and Wu (2015), and Mitchell and 
Prusa (2016). 
14
 Table 3 shows seven disputes in total but notice that the first one did not lead to the establishment of a Panel. 
15
 Mitchell and Prusa (2016, pages 318-319). 
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Table 3. Chinese AD/CVD Investigations with Recurring Issues 
Investigation MOFCOM 
Initiation 
MOFCOM 
Final 
Determination 
WTO 
Consultation 
Request 
WTO 
Report 
Adoption 
China – Fasteners 
(DS407) 
29 Dec. 2008 n.a. 7 May 2010 n.a 
China – GOES 
(DS414) 
1 June 2009 11 Apr. 2010 15 Sep. 2010 16 Nov. 2012 
China – X-Ray 
Equipment  
(DS425) 
23 Oct. 2009 23 Jan. 2011 25 July 2011 24 Apr. 2013 
China – Broiler Products  
(DS427)  
27 Sep. 2009 7 Sep. 2010 20 Sep. 2011 25 Sep. 2013 
China – Autos  
(DS440) 
6 Nov. 2009 15 Dec. 2011 5 July 2012 18 June 2014 
China – HP-SSST  
(DS454, DS460) 
8 Sep. 2011 9 Nov. 2012 20 Dec. 2012 
13 June 2013 
28 Oct. 2015 
China – Cellulose Pulp 
(DS483) 
6 Feb. 2013 4 April 2014 15 April 2014 n.a. 
Source: based on Mitchell and Prusa (2016, page 318). 
Notes: ‘n.a.’ stands for not available, as the case did not lead to the establishment of a Panel since 
MOFCOM terminated the provisional AD duties after the request for consultation from the 
European Union. 
Regarding the WTO disputes concerning MOFCOM’s AD measures, the most puzzling question is 
how such controversial practices were not contested until the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan suddenly decided to sue China in multiple cases within a relatively short time span. The data 
available from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2016) actually show that those complaining 
members have been the major target of AD actions from the very early stage of China’s AD system. In 
fact, Table 4 shows that the United States, the European Union, and Japan are among the top target 
countries of China’s AD actions, since China introduced its AD law in 1997. When AD actions against 
individual EU member countries are considered together with cases against the European Union, the 
total number of AD investigations against the European Union and its members reach 43, making it 
the top target (together with Japan) and the European Union, Japan and US are the top three targeted 
countries. Furthermore, the order of the top three target countries would remain the same if the ranking 
was based on AD measures. 
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Table 4. China’s Initiation of AD Investigations against Other WTO Members: 1997-2015 
Exporter AD Initiations Exporter AD Initiations 
Japan 43 Saudi Arabia 3 
United States 42 United Kingdom 3 
Korea 35 Canada 2 
European Union 26 Belgium 1 
Chinese Taipei 16 Brazil 1 
Russian Federation 11 Finland 1 
India 7 Iran 1 
Singapore 7 Italy 1 
Thailand 6 Kazakhstan 1 
Germany 5 Mexico 1 
Indonesia 5 New Zealand 1 
Malaysia 4 South Africa 1 
France 3 Ukraine 1 
Netherlands 3 Turkey 1 
 TOTAL 232  
Source: Bown (2016). 
As shown in Figure 1, the peak time for China’s AD actions was actually between 2002 and 2006, 
much earlier than the time when MOFCOM’s practices were challenged simultaneously by multiple 
cases in the WTO dispute settlement framework. The mere fact that a WTO member uses many AD 
actions does not necessarily guarantee more WTO litigations. However, it is very hard to understand 
why MOFCOM’s practices were never challenged until the European Union brought the first ever 
consultation request against China’s provisional AD measures in China – Fasteners in May 2010.16 In 
fact, it is likely that many early AD measures, especially those implemented with little administrative 
experience, have suffered from many flaws similar to those ruled in recent cases. 
  
                                                     
16
 China — Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners from the European Union (DS407) is the 
very first WTO dispute against China involving AD. Notice that this case did not proceed to the establishment of a Panel 
because China terminated the provisional AD measures after the consultation request was raised by the European Union. 
See WTO, G/ADP/N/195/CHN/Rev.1, 2. 
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Figure 1. Yearly Trend of China’s AD Actions: 1997-2015  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bown (2016). 
As a matter of fact, India seems to present a similar situation. It is one of the most active AD user in 
the WTO having initiated 764 AD investigations and imposed 558 AD measures between 1992 and 
2015 (Bown, 2016). Still, there are only four consultation requests against India’s AD measures and 
no case has reached the stage of even a Panel being established.
17
 The actual size of the Indian market 
for products subject to AD measures may explain the lack of WTO disputes, probably for some or 
even many industry sectors, but surely not for all industries. More importantly though, the share of 
Indian exports subject to AD measures by key importers is much smaller compared to the equivalent 
figures for China. For example, this share is only 1.3% and 3.9% for the stock of measures in place in 
2013 in the European Union and the United States, respectively, while the equivalent shares for 
Chinese exports are 7.3% and 9.1%, respectively (Bown, 2014).
18
 Thus, the size of China’s exports 
and its strategic use of AD (i.e. India does not specifically target major exporters) may explain the 
apparent difference between India and China. In any case, this striking difference of major WTO 
members in terms of their policies against China’s AD actions appears to demand more research in the 
future. 
3. Key Legal Findings 
The China – HP-SSST case is notably the only AD dispute against China appealed by complainants. In 
the China – GOES case appealed by China, the Appellate Body rejected all of China’s appeal claims. 
The rejections may seem to explain China’s choice against appealing the Panel rulings in the 
subsequent three AD disputes. But in the case at hand, not only China, but also Japan and European 
Union filed an appeal on the Panel rulings, and China essentially lost almost all legal claims. 
                                                     
17
 The cases are India — Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Products from the European Communities 
(DS304); India — Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh (DS306); India — Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Products from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (DS318), and India — 
Anti-Dumping Duties on USB Flash Drives from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu 
(DS498). 
18
 These statistics are based on the total AD, countervailing, and safeguard measures. 
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As summarized in Table 5, the legal issues raised in this case were also addressed in the previous 
AD disputes in very similar manners (and most of them appear to be cited in the ongoing dispute 
China – Cellulose Pulp launched by Canada). We will not repeat the explanation of the Panel and 
Appellate Body rulings since the reasoning for most legal claims are essentially identical. Instead, we 
highlight below the points to be distinguished from the earlier cases. 
Table 5. Comparison of Legal Rulings in the WTO Disputes on Chinese AD Measures 
Substantive Legal Issues GOES 
(DS414) 
X-Ray 
Equipment 
(DS425) 
Broiler 
Products 
(DS427) 
Autos 
(DS440) 
HP-SSST 
(DS454, 
DS460) 
Art.2.2 
Cost of Production 
  X  X 
(AB: X) 
Art.2.4 
Fair Comparison 
    X 
Arts.3.1/3.2 
Price effects 
X 
(AB: X) 
X X X X/O 
(AB: X) 
Arts.3.1/3.4 
Impact Analysis 
X X   X/O 
(AB: X) 
Arts.3.1/3.5 
Causation 
X X  X X 
(AB: X) 
Arts.3.1/4.1 
Definition of Domestic Industry 
  O O  
Art.6.2 
Opportunity to Meet Parties 
with Adverse Interests 
  X   
Art.6.5 
Non-confidential  
Summaries 
X X X X X 
(AB: X) 
Art.6.7/Annex I(7) 
Rejection of Information 
    X 
(AB: X) 
Art.6.8/Annex II 
Facts Available 
X  X X O 
Art.6.9 
Essential Facts 
X 
(AB: X) 
X X X X/O 
(AB: X/O) 
Art.7.4 
Provisional Measures 
    X 
Art.12.2 
Public Notice 
X 
(AB: X) 
X X O X/O 
Notes: ‘X’ stands for ruling of violation and ‘O’ for ruling of non-violation or to reject 
complainant’s claims. 
3.1 Fair Comparison in Dumping Calculation (Article 2.4) 
The European Union contended that China acted inconsistently with Article 2.4, requiring a fair 
comparison between the export price and the normal value, because MOFCOM failed to account for 
differences in physical characteristics between Grade C sold in the European Union and Grade C 
primary boiler tube exported to China. China submitted that the company Salzgitter Mannesmann 
Stainless Tubes (SMST) never lodged any substantiated request in relation to a fair comparison 
concerning the relevant sales. 
The main issue for the Panel was whether or not SMST actually requested to allow physical 
differences affecting price comparability within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping 
Dukgeun Ahn and Maurizio Zanardi 
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Agreement. The Panel explained that Article 2.4 offers no guidance as to whether the differences 
affecting price comparability may be allowed or not. 
In fact, SMST’s Questionnaire Response did not request any adjustments for differences in 
physical characteristics. But, in its comments on MOFCOM’s preliminary dumping disclosure, SMST 
stated that MOFCOM should have excluded certain sales, because they involved very thin tubes that 
were not used in primary boiler systems. Also, during the verification process, SMST provided a 
diagram indicating that tubes sold in the EU markets were thinner than those sold in China and that 
there were differences in the production processes. In addition, the Panel noted MOFCOM’s refusal to 
exclude the smaller products in its final dumping disclosure and SMST’s subsequent arguments that 
the secondary tubes sold in the EU market should have been excluded from the normal value 
calculation in its comments on the final disclosure.  
In light of the above facts, the Panel ruled that SMST did request an adjustment, under Article 2.4, 
to reflect physical differences affecting price comparability. Although SMST initially reported no 
differences affecting price comparability, “it should have been clear to MOFCOM that SMST changed 
its position in this regard during the course of the investigation.”19 It explained that, “[a]t a minimum, 
an objective and impartial investigating authority would have acknowledged the fact that an 
adjustment was being sought, and considered whether that adjustment was warranted, and if the 
necessary information had been provided.” Thereby, the Panel found that China acted inconsistently 
with AD Agreement Article 2.4 by failing to address SMST’s adjustment request.  
This ruling exemplifies the WTO’s attitude towards the trade remedy practices of members for 
preventing abusive uses. In the EC – Fasteners case, China argued against the European Union that an 
investigating authority must evaluate any identified differences, regardless of whether a request for 
adjustment was made or not.
20
 The Appellate Body explained that China’s assertion placed an undue 
burden on an investigating authority to assess each difference in order to determine if adjustment was 
needed in every case, even without a request by the interested party. Therefore, the investigating 
authority’s duty had become to “take steps to achieve clarity as to the adjustment claimed and then 
determine whether and to what extent that adjustment is merited”.21 The Panel ruling in the China – 
HP-SSST case clarified that an investigating authority should be able to incorporate the respondents’ 
change of their positions “during the course of the investigation”. Even so, it seems to take too many 
rulings to elucidate various legal issues such as when the change of firms’ position is too late to be 
reflected for a final determination, what takes to change its position in the investigation, and how 
much change of positions should be allowed. 
3.2 Injury Determination 
Article 3 of the AD Agreement stipulates the rules and requirements for injury determination. The 
Appellate Body had already explained in China – GOES that Article 3 contemplates a “logical 
progression” in the investigating authority’s injury determination.22 An examination of the volume and 
price effects pursuant to Article 3.2 and an impact analysis on a domestic industry pursuant to Article 
3.4 are linked through a causation and non-attribution analysis between the dumped imports and the 
injury to the domestic industry under Article 3.5. Based on this explanation, the Appellate Body 
reviewed the Panel rulings in the case at hand and ruled that MOFCOM’s assessment was inconsistent 
with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5. 
                                                     
19
 Panel Report, para.7.83. 
20
 European Communities – Definitive Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China, 
WT/DS397/AB/R, para.517. 
21
 Ibid., para.519. 
22
 AB Report, China – GOES, para.128. 
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3.2.1 Price Effects (Articles 3.1 and 3.2) 
Japan and the European Union argued that MOFCOM’s conclusion of a significant price undercutting 
by the imports of Grade B and Grade C was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2. Although the Panel 
found a violation in respect to MOFCOM’s failure to account properly for differences in quantities 
when comparing imported prices with domestic prices of Grade C, it rejected the complainants’ other 
arguments: (1) that MOFCOM failed to consider whether Grade C dumped imports had any price 
undercutting effect on domestic Grade C (in the sense of placing downward pressure on domestic 
prices) and (2) that MOFCOM improperly extended its finding of price undercutting in respect of 
Grades B and C to the domestic like products as a whole, including domestic Grade A. 
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s characterization of the obligation under Article 3.2 
that price undercutting can be determined simply on the basis of whether there is a mathematical 
difference, at any point in time during the POI, between the prices of the dumped imports and the 
comparable domestic products. It emphasized that the term “price undercutting” in Article 3.2 is used 
in present participle, interpreting that the inquiry under Article 3.2 refers to a pricing conduct that is 
continued over a duration of time, rather than a mere isolated instance of imported goods having been 
sold at lower prices than the domestic like products. Therefore, it ruled that the price undercutting 
analysis in Article 3.2 requires “a dynamic assessment of price developments and trends in the 
relationship between the prices over the entire POI,” rather than a static examination of price 
difference at any point in time.
23
  
In addition, it noted that “price undercutting” in Article 3.2 is qualified by the word “significant,” 
dictionary definition of which is provided as “important, notable, [and] consequential.”24 Thus, the 
significance of the price undercutting should be determined by the magnitude of the price undercutting, 
which necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case. For this decision, an investigating 
authority must objectively examine “all positive evidence relating to the nature of the product or 
product types at issue, how long the price undercutting has been taking place and to what extent, and, 
as appropriate, the relative market shares of the product types with respect to which the authority has 
made a finding of price undercutting.”25 The Appellate Body explained that the Panel’s approach to 
focus on a mere mathematical comparison might be a useful starting point but does not provide a 
proper basis to find sufficient price undercutting. On this basis, it overturned the Panel’s legal 
interpretation that a significant price undercutting can be found by simply considering whether subject 
imports sell at lower prices than comparable domestic products. 
Turning to the pertinent facts, the Appellate Body noted that MOFCOM failed to explain the basis 
for its finding that imports of Grade C were underselling domestic Grade C, since the price of 
domestic Grade C increased from 2009-2010, while the prices of dumped imports of Grade C actually 
fell over that period. It explained that, under the specific facts of this case, MOFCOM could not 
provide a meaningful basis for the injury analysis because trends in domestic prices by grade had no 
apparent relationship in terms of magnitude or direction with trends in import prices. On this basis, the 
Appellate Body concluded that MOFCOM’s assessment of a significant price undercutting in regards 
to Grade C imports from Japan and the European Union, as compared with the price of domestic 
Grade C, is inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2. 
On the other hand, the European Union argued that, despite the fact that there were “no relevant 
imports of Grade A” and that most of the domestic sales were of Grade A, MOFCOM had found that 
the price undercutting, conducted by imported Grades B and C, has a significant effect on the domestic 
product as a whole, even without having conducted any cross-grade analysis. The Panel concluded that 
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the existence of price undercutting for the purpose of Article 3.2 must be shown in respect of the 
dumped imports at issue, not the entire range of goods making up the domestic like product. In this 
case, the Panel considered that the significance of price undercutting by dumped imports of Grades B 
and C should be assessed in relation to the price of domestically produced Grades B and C, and not in 
relation to Grade A products. 
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that an investigating authority is neither required under 
Article 3.2 to establish the existence of price undercutting for each product type under investigation, 
nor with respect to the entire range of goods making up the domestic like product. However, it 
emphasized the legal standards it clarified above that an investigating authority must undertake a 
dynamic assessment of whether the dumped imports are causing injury. In that regard, it disagreed 
with the Panel’s ruling that MOFCOM was not required to assess the significance of price 
undercutting by the dumped imports in relation to the proportion of domestic production for which no 
price undercutting was found. 
In this case, MOFCOM indeed found that, during the POI, the dumped imports and domestic sales 
were concentrated in different segments of the HP-SSST market. While the majority of Chinese 
domestic HP-SSST production was related to Grade A, the majority of domestic sales was of Grade 
A.
26
 Thus any objective investigating authority should have taken into account the relevant market 
shares of the respective product types to examine whether there had been a significant price 
undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the prices of the domestic like product. 
Similarly, an objective analysis of price effects should also have considered significant differences in 
the prices of these product types. On this basis, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding and 
concluded that MOFCOM's assessment of a significant price undercutting is inconsistent with AD 
Agreement Articles 3.1 and 3.2.  
3.2.2 Impact Analysis (Articles 3.1 and 3.4) 
Japan and the European Union claimed that MOFCOM was required to undertake a segmented impact 
analysis of dumped imports on the domestic industry, having found no significant increase in the 
volume of dumped imports and the price effects with respect to Grades B and C only. China refuted 
this argument by claiming that Article 3.4 requires MOFCOM to assess the dumping impact on the 
domestic industry as a whole. China pointed out that the two domestic producers making up the 
domestic industry were producing all three grades, such that it could not distinguish a part of the 
domestic industry that produced only Grade A.  
The Panel recalled its ruling that in finding price undercutting in respect of Grades B and C, 
MOFCOM was not required by Article 3.2 to consider the effect of subject Grade B and C imports on 
domestic Grade A. Thus MOFCOM’s failure to undertake a cross-grade price analysis did not 
preclude a finding that the segment of the domestic industry producing Grade A products could be 
impacted by dumped imports. Moreover, the Panel noted that MOFCOM defined the domestic 
industry as one comprising of two domestic producers accounting for a major proportion of total 
domestic production. Accordingly, it ruled that an evaluation of the state of the domestic industry 
under Article 3.4 ought to examine the state of those two producers regarding all types of HP-SSST, 
not just Grades B and C. 
In the appeal, given that MOFCOM did not find volume and price effects arising out of imports of 
Grade A HP-SSST, the complainants argued that Grade A should not form part of the impact analysis 
under Article 3.4 because it must be considered as a non-attribution factor under Article 3.5. China 
                                                     
26
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claimed that the obligation to undertake the impact analysis under Article 3.4 must be distinguished 
from the obligation to conduct the causation analysis under Article 3.5. 
The Appellate Body explained that although Article 3.4 does not prescribe exclusive methodology, 
an investigating authority’s examination of the relationship between the dumped imports and the state 
of the domestic industry should enable the authority to derive an understanding about the impact of the 
dumped imports on the domestic industry as a whole. Even though the authority is required to examine 
the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry pursuant to Article 3.4, it is not required to 
demonstrate causality specifically mandated by Article 3.5. 
In this case, MOFCOM did not make a finding of price undercutting in respect of Grade A, since 
there were no imports of Grade A after 2008. The Appellate Body noted that the Panel ruling states “a 
limited finding of price undercutting will have obvious implications for an authority’s assessment of 
whether dumped imports caused material injury to the domestic industry [but] this is an assessment to 
be made pursuant to Article 3.5, rather than 3.4.” 27  It emphasized that Article 3.4 requires the 
evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry. It 
further stated that such evaluation must provide a “meaningful basis” for an injury analysis. Therefore, 
an investigating authority should consider the relative market shares of product types found with price 
undercutting; and for example, the duration and extent of price undercutting, price depression or price 
suppression. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel in its interpretation of Articles 3.1 and 3.4 to the 
extent that the Panel found that the results of the inquiries under Article 3.2 are not relevant to the 
impact analysis under Article 3.4.  
3.3 Disclosure of Essential Facts (Article 6.9) 
Japan and the European Union contended that China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 because 
MOFCOM failed to disclose any information relating to: (i) the specific cost and sales data used to 
calculate normal value and export prices underlying the margin calculations; (ii) adjustments to this 
data, for instance, to take account of taxes and freight; and (iii) information on the calculation 
methodology, including the formulae used in calculations, the data applied in these formulae, and the 
methodology applying these data to construct normal value, export price, and production costs.  
Noting the ruling in China – Broiler Products that, if the essential facts the authority is using are in 
the possession of the respondent, even a narrative description of the data cannot ipso facto be 
considered insufficient disclosure,
28
 the Panel decided that Article 6.9 does not mandate disclosures 
containing the entirety of the essential facts when the respondent has the possession of the relevant 
essential facts. On this basis, unlike the previous disputes, the Panel in this case rejected the EU claim 
that MOFCOM had to disclose a spreadsheet “duly completed with the data actually relied on by the 
investigating authority”. 29  It explained that even a narrative description would suffice in the 
appropriate circumstances in case such description does not leave uncertainty as to the essential facts 
under consideration. 
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel and ruled that it does not suffice for an investigating 
authority to simply disclose “the essential facts under consideration”. It explained that the authority 
must disclose the essential facts that “form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive 
measures”. Because a party could not know which facts the authority selected among the facts 
originally provided by the interested party, the mere fact that the investigating authority referred to 
data in the possession of an interested party would not be enough to disclose the essential facts for a 
decision to apply definitive measures. After reversing the Panel ruling on the principle for disclosing 
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the essential facts, the Appellate Body reviewed MOFCOM’s preliminary and final dumping 
disclosures. Then, it concluded that China acted inconsistently with Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement, 
because MOFCOM failed to disclose adequately the data underlying its determination of dumping 
concerning SMST and Tubacex. 
This issue was invariably raised in all previous disputes involving the Chinese AD actions and 
resulted in WTO inconsistency ruling by the panels. In fact, disclose of essential facts under Article 
6.9 is a typical systemic issue related to the WTO trade remedy system. What constitutes “essential 
facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures” 
and who should have an authority to determine the scope of “essential facts” raises a fundamental 
question for AD investigations. WTO Members adopt a wide variety of practices from disclosing 
computer programs for calculating dumping margins to merely indicate some statistical data – often 
blank parts for confidential information. It will take more disputes to elaborate the rules under Article 
6.9 but clarifications on the level of disclosure and who is entitled to decide on disclosure (e.g. Panels, 
national authorities) can potentially have major repercussions, as firms may decide not to disclose 
much if, for example, WTO Panels can make everything public. When it comes to China, however, it 
is evident that MOFCOM needs to significantly enhance transparency in terms of its AD system. 
It is noted that many of the litigated issues related to transparency of the AD proceedings including 
accessibility to non-confidential information, disclosure of essential facts, and public notice were 
presented by a group of WTO Member in the Doha rules negotiation as “doable” elements to 
“recalibrate” the negotiation.30  
4. Legal and Economic Analysis 
Although the dispute involves several procedural and substantive issues, the following discussion 
focuses on two crucial substantive issues: price undercutting and causation analysis. As the previous 
AD-related WTO disputes against China focus on similar issues (see Table 5), some of these 
commonalities will be highlighted in the discussion. Interestingly for the current dispute, the Panel 
sided with China on the price undercutting issue only for these findings to be reversed by the 
Appellate Body. The Panel ruled in favor of the European Union and Japan on causation analysis and 
these findings were upheld by the Appellate Body. 
4.1 Price Undercutting 
Under this item, the complainants raised three points: i) improper comparison of import prices and 
domestic prices of Grade C products, ii) price undercutting merely defined as mathematical difference 
of import prices and domestic prices for Grade C products, and iii) extending finding of price 
undercutting from Grades B and C to the entire domestic product (i.e. including Grade A). 
From an economic perspective, it is curious that so much attention is paid to Grade C products 
when there is virtually no domestic production of this variety. As illustrated by the data in Table 2, 
only in the first six months of 2011 subject imports of Grade C products exhibited a market share 
lower than 99% and still above 90%! And at the same time, import and domestic prices moved in 
opposite directions, with the domestic price of Grade C increasing 112.80% between 2009 and 2010 
while import prices were decreasing (although both prices decreased over the period 2008-06/2011). 
Given these divergent trends, it is instructive (and correct) for the Appellate Body to have placed great 
emphasis on the need to assess the continuing existence of undercutting. It explicitly clarified that 
“[a]n examination of such developments and trends includes assessing whether import and domestic 
prices are moving in the same or contrary directions, and whether there has been a sudden and 
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substantial increase in the domestic prices”.31 This argument mirrors the discussion in Mitchell and 
Prusa (2016) on how investigating authorities often use trend analysis to compare prices. In this 
specific case, if MOFCOM had done one, it would have detected a “non-obvious trend analysis” (in 
the words of Mitchell and Prusa, 2016) where prices of domestic and imported goods move in 
opposite directions (see Figure 2 in Mitchell and Prusa, 2016, with opposite labels as it is the domestic 
price to have increased in the case at hand). A negative correlation per se would not be a sufficient 
condition to discard the possibility of undercutting but a more thorough analysis would be required, 
which would also have had to consider “the trivial volume of domestically produced Product C”.32 
Unfortunately, the data discussed in the various public documents are very limited and do not allow 
further considerations on the absolute value and difference between import and domestic prices. 
Based on the public documents, we can infer that price undercutting was established for Grade B. 
However, it is puzzling how MOFCOM may have been able to conclude that price undercutting was 
present for the entire domestic product. The very fact that there were no imports of Grade A products 
in 2009-06/2011 implies that no price undercutting for this product was taking place (and imports only 
represented 1.45% of the market share in 2008). At the same time, it is also worth emphasizing that 
most domestic production of the subject good is of the Grade A variant (i.e. 79.9% during the POI). A 
possible way to explain MOFCOM’s conclusion of undercutting at the industry level would be the 
consideration of cross-grade price correlations. However, MOFCOM did not provide any evidence of 
such correlations and simply stated that “price correlation is a clear consequence of the ability of 
subject imports of the high-end grades (Grades B and C) to substitute for the low-end grade (Grade 
A)”.33 However, Panel and Appellate Body rejected this simplistic statement. 
Interestingly, the discussion above is reminiscent of the analysis done by Prusa and Vermulst (2014) 
in the China – GOES case. When reflecting on the shortcomings of MOFCOM’s price effects’ 
analysis, they also concluded that “one wonders how much analysis was actually involved in [China’s] 
price effects ‘analysis’.” But the similarities do not stop here, Prusa and Vermulst (2015) also 
emphasize the differences between the varieties of imported products and those produced domestically, 
as MOFCOM had failed “to account for the variations in the product mix” of chicken parts in the 
China – Broiler Products case. 
As a result of the arguments just presented, we wonder whether MOFCOM has properly defined 
the domestic like product. HP-SSST involve three different variants in terms of technical 
characteristics. In particular, “[s]teel tubes used in ultra-supercritical power plant boilers ([Grade B] 
and [Grade C]) significantly outperform steel tubes used in supercritical power plant boilers ([Grade 
A]) in the aspects of steam resistance oxidation thickness and fly ash corrosion resistance.”34 Although 
higher grades can substitute for the low-end grade (i.e. Grade A), the existing substantial price 
differences between these products may render this technical substitutability irrelevant. In fact, 
footnote 333 of the Panel report states that “Grade B is about double the price of Grade A, and Grade 
C is about triple the price of Grade A” and China has not disputed this claim from Japan (see footnote 
333). This argument is forcefully made by the Appellate Body as well in paragraph 5.263 when 
discussing MOFCOM’s finding on price correlation. Still the European Union and Japan did not raise 
any issue relating to the definition of product and industry, while the issue of industry was raised in 
the dispute China – X-Ray Equipment. As a matter of fact, Moore and Wu (2015) summarize one of 
the EU’s allegations in this case as whether the Chinese authority had “appropriately defin[ed] the 
boundaries of the product scope of the investigated sector when undertaking its price effects analysis 
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and its analysis of the state of the domestic industry”.35 Still, even in the China – X-Ray Equipment 
case the European Union did not challenge the product definition although it noted that “there is a 
wide and recognizable gap between high- and lo-energy scanners” which leads to “very large 
disparities in price”,36 just like in the present case. Moore and Wu (2015) suggest that this may be due 
to the lesson the European Union learned from the EU – Footwear case brought by China against the 
European Union. In that case, the Panel left ample margins of maneuvering for the investigating 
authorities to determine ‘like’ products. As Moore and Wu (2015) speculated regarding the HP-SSST 
case, ongoing at the time, this issue “will be a recurrent theme in future WTO disputes” (page 284). 
Still, the scope of product under investigation has also some bearing on the complainants’ claim 
related to impact analysis in relation to Articles 3.1 and 3.4. In particular, the European Union and 
Japan claimed, among other things, that “MOFCOM improperly considered the impact of subject 
imports on the domestic industry as a whole, in respect of all three product grades, even though it had 
only found price effects in respect of Grades B and C.”37 Article 3.4 requires an “examination of the 
impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all 
relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry” but the Panel 
found it “unclear … how a determination of injury in respect of the domestic industry as a whole -- 
including an evaluation of the state of that industry as a whole -- may be premised, from the outset, on 
the exclusion of a given segment of that industry.”38 While we agree that a given segment of the 
industry should not be excluded at the outset (once the domestic like product had been defined as it 
had been), the shares in Table 2 would prompt a careful consideration of how imports of Grades B and 
C can be taken to affect a domestic industry that is heavily (i.e. around 80%) concentrated on the 
production of Grade A, given that no cross-price correlation between these grades has been established. 
With little changes in the imports’ market shares of Grades B and C between 2009 and 2010, the 
overall market share of imports for like products plummeted by about 45% as a result of lower 
demand for these grades accompanied by an increase in demand for Grade A products, which was 
only met by domestic production. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s decision on this point 
because it had reversed the other aspects of Panel’s decision, on which this item relied upon. 
In fact, while the AD Agreement defines the term “like product” to be used for dumping 
calculation and injury determination in Article 2.6, it does not provide any rules concerning how to set 
forth the scope of the product under investigation, or “subject product”.39 The scope of the like product 
can be determined only after the scope of subject product has been clearly defined. Investigating 
authorities often employ a rather broad scope of subject products so as to avoid circumvention and 
increase protection effects, as shown in this case. But such practices make subsequent investigations 
much more complicated due to the difficulties to ensure fair comparison of dumping elements and an 
objective assessment of injury.  
This problem has been addressed in the Doha rules negotiation. Some WTO members proposed to 
include only “products under the same conditions of competition” in the product under 
consideration.
40
 Another proposal specified that the product under consideration must compete in the 
same geographical market in the same period.
41
 The proposal to distinguish distinct product under 
consideration suggested to examine “the physical characteristics of the imports, including technical 
specifications and quality, and their market characteristics, including end uses, substitutability, pricing 
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levels and distribution channels.”42 These efforts denote the need for clarification on this issue. Yet, 
the fact that there has not been any serious initiative to revive the Doha negotiation after the Nairobi 
Ministerial Conference in 2015 seems to indicate prolonged systemic ambiguity on this matter. 
4.2 Causation Analysis: Non-attribution 
A real challenge of antidumping investigations is conducting causation analysis, which is required by 
Article 3.5. The issue is how to single out dumping as the cause of injury to the domestic industry. 
Ideally, proper econometric tools should be employed so that (most) factors can be appropriately 
controlled and the role of dumping is clearly identified. Unfortunately, data requirements and the 
technicalities of the methodologies do not make econometric work a standard toolkit in antidumping 
investigations (see Prusa and Sharp, 2001, for an example of econometric methods applied to a US 
antidumping investigation). At the same time, the current case provides an example of a very 
superficial analysis on the part of MOFCOM, which puts too much emphasis on the market shares 
reported in Table 2. And again, this aspect has been the subject of other Panel’s decisions in previous 
trade disputes targeting Chinese AD rulings. For example, in the China – X-Ray Equipment dispute the 
Panel identified some shortcomings in MOFCOM’s causation analysis related to the failure of the 
investigating authority “to consider “known facts” ” and the failure “to consider evidence relating to 
other factors”.43 Similarly, Qin and Vandenbussche (2016) in analyzing the recourse by the United 
States in the China – GOES dispute, raise the need to engage in some form of econometric analysis to 
establish what the counterfactual situation would have been had dumping not occurred. 
As a matter of fact, the statistics on market shares must also be complemented with data on import 
volumes, which are graphed in Figure 2.
44
 The significant reduction in import levels from the 
European Union and Japan without substantial changes in import market shares of Grade B and C 
products is consistent with a significant decline in consumption of these grades (as mentioned in the 
Panel report). At the same time, the report states that the “apparent consumption of Grade A 
increased” 45  and that “[t]he capacity and output of the domestic industry of like products have 
increased”.46 And as discussed previously, there is no clear evidence of cross-grade price correlations. 
These considerations make it difficult to conclude that there is prima facie evidence to prove that 
dumping from the European Union and Japan can be considered the prime cause of injury to the 
domestic industry. Thus, a more in depth analysis is required. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the domestic industry is in such a distressed situation given that 
“from 2008 to 2010, domestic sales and market share of the domestic industry of like products have 
both increased. The capacity and output of the domestic industry of like products have increased 
synchronously. Driven by capacity and output growth, job creation and labor productivity of the 
domestic industry of like products also increased. Against the general backdrop of rising labor costs in 
domestic markets, salary per head in the domestic industry of like products showed an upward 
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trend.”47 In fact, these indicators all point to relatively good conditions for the domestic industry 
during the POI. 
It is true that it is not all rosy for the domestic industry since “EOP [end of period] inventories of 
the domestic industry of like products was rising year on year … From 2008 to 2010, revenue decline 
on an annualized basis was 15.50%. … Unit operating margin decreased 56.39% annually. As a 
consequence, pretax profits and net cash flow from operating activities of the domestic industry of like 
products both dropped, 67.47% and 47.78% respectively on an annualized basis. Shrinking pretax 
profits resulted in lower ROI for the domestic industry of like products. … sales revenue dropped by 
0.38% year on-year. … Unit operating margin decreased 52.50% compared with the same period of 
2010. As a consequence, pretax profits of the domestic industry of like products dropped by 72.19% 
compared with the same period of 2010.”48 However, these relatively adverse conditions should be 
analyzed in light of the facts discussed above (e.g. Table 2 and Figure 2), as they are consistent with 
increased output from domestic sources. This comment sounds familiar with similar arguments made 
by the Panel in the China – X-Ray Equipment dispute in which “9 of the 16 indicator of the state of the 
industry were found to be positive rather than negative” (Moore and Wu, 2015, page 262). In fact, that 
Panel determined that MOFCOM should have considered the impact of the Chinese producer capacity 
expansion, rising inventories, and possibly aggressive pricing strategy (Moore and Wu, 2015, page 
264). 
Figure 2. Imports of Subject Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from Comtrade, based on the 6-digit HS tariff lines 730441 and 730449 as listed in 
Bown (2016). 
In conclusion, not only MOFCOM did not provide a thorough causation analysis but even the limited 
data publicly available cast serious doubts on whether dumping of Grades B and C products from the 
European Union and Japan can be considered to be the root problem for the adverse conditions of the 
domestic industry described in the previous paragraph. Reliance on market shares certainly cannot be 
taken as an attempt of a serious causation analysis. 
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Conclusion 
China introduced its AD law in 1997 and has been a relatively intense user of the AD system since the 
accession to the WTO in December 2001 (see Figure 1). Yet it is only in 2010 that the first WTO 
dispute involving AD measures imposed by China was started. Since then, four subsequent disputes in 
less than six years have involved similar procedural and substantial issues and another one is ongoing. 
China – HP-SSST is the last one to have reached its conclusion and it focused on the usual issues of 
fair comparison in dumping calculations, injury determination, and disclosure of essential facts. One 
further common aspect of all these disputes is that the rulings of the WTO Panels and Appellate Body 
have been consistently and overwhelmingly in favor of the complainants. 
So far, China appears to have constrained its AD actions probably because it exports massively 
unbalanced amounts to other trading partners. For example, over the period 1995-2015 Chinese 
exports have been targeted by 100, 80, 142 AD measures by the US, EU and India, respectively. 
Instead, the Chinese government has imposed AD measures only 34, 20, 7 times against the US, EU 
and India, respectively (Bown, 2016).
49
 Other than relatively less frequent, China’s AD actions have 
not shown any notable distinction from the patterns of major AD users.
50
 
In the coming years, it is very likely that China will come to rely more on AD actions if the trade 
conflicts against its major trading partners such as the United States and European Union become 
more serious due to the controversies over market economy status and overcapacity in heavy 
industries. Moreover, AD actions driven by retaliatory purposes may increase as the Chinese domestic 
market becomes larger.
51
 As a matter of fact, the AD Regulations of China even stipulates 
“corresponding measures” against any country or region that discriminatorily imposes AD measures 
on exportation from China.
52
 That will inevitably lead to more WTO disputes concerning China’s AD 
measures in the coming years.  
Against the backdrop of such possibly increased use of AD measures by China, one would hope 
that the rulings of WTO Panels and Appellate Body since 2010 will serve to clarify once a for all how 
the WTO AD Agreement should be interpreted and applied by MOFCOM. It should be the case that 
this body of jurisprudence will now be the rule in all of subsequent MOFCOM’s investigations and 
that five disputes were needed just because their overlapping timeframe did not allow China to rectify 
its practice before a new dispute was begun. Hence, the case on HP-SSST should have been the last 
part of growing pains although the current dispute initiated by Canada may signal otherwise (if the 
final verdict will be in Canada’s favor).  
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